Some digital business models may be so innovative that they overw helm existing regulatory mechanisms, both legislation and historical jurisprudence, and require extension to or modification of antitrust law . Regulatory policies that w ere developed in response to 19 th or 20 th century antitrust concerns dealt principally w ith economies of scale leading to monopoly pow er, and may not be w ell suited to the issues of netw ork effects or third-party payer online business models like sponsored search. From the perspective of information systems economics w e investigate if such third party payer digital systems require intervention as profound as the Government's innovative approach to the problems posed by A T& T in the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, establishing the first private regulated monopoly. Google provides an example of a company w hose innovative digital business model is difficult to fit into current regulatory framew orks, and may provide examples of the issues that might require an extension to regulatory policy.
A merican commercial and regulatory legal practice w as largely formulated during an industrial era, w hen the dangers of monopoly market pow er w ere associated w ith manufacturing giants. Of course, the courts have creatively constructed the present antitrust doctrine to keep it as relevant as possible, and much of w hat is applied to cases today is the result of the courts' interpretations of the Sherman A ct rather than the Sherman A ct itself. Still, the courts are alw ays to some extent constrained by the original legislation that defines the issues before them and by the history of jurisprudence, w hich itself often lags behind industrial practices. M anufacturers note that the courts are much better at regulating them than they are at regulating giant retailers like Wal-M art and H ome Depot; of course, at the time that the Sherman A ct w as drafted, antitrust w as far more concerned w ith the very real prospect of giant manufacturing trusts than it w as w ith the then-unimaginable problems caused by giant retailers.
This leads us to ask how appropriate existing regulatory framew orks are to competition among businesses w ith modern, post-industrial digital business models. Inevitably, attempting to apply existing law to these businesses w ill need to deal w ith issues never anticipated either w hen legislation w as drafted or w hen it w as interpreted over decades of jurisprudence. Inevitably, there w ill be disputes, and this paper addresses w here they w ill arise. We also ask w hen commercial and regulatory legal practice might actually fail to address the new competitive environment and thus need to be explicitly altered and updated. We believe that extensions to antitrust w ill be required, that to some extent extensions can be addressed through additional flexibility and reinterpretation by the courts, and that to some extent legislative change w ill be required. We use the perspective of information economics to address limitations, and to guide extensions. We believe that technology determines w hat it is possible for firms to do, and the interaction of economics and technology guides the behavior of profit maximizing firms. When the behavior of these firms is not consistent w ith public policy objectives, technology, economics, and profit maximizing behavior are largely outside society's control, but the law s and regulations that guide the firms are not.
We believe that the implications of current technology are so far outside of w hat w as anticipated w hen most of our regulatory framew orks w ere constructed that these framew orks may fail to provide socially desirable outcomes w hen firms rationally adopt new ly available business models. A lthough w e are w riting for an information systems readership, w e have felt it necessary to provide a significant number of legal citations. First, these citations take the debate out of the domain of mere opinion, and provide the basis for our analyses. Second, and more importantly, if our information systems colleagues are to extend our w ork, they should not need to reproduce our legal research, but rather can begin their ow n analyses w ith a firm understanding of the legal jurisprudence upon w hich the current legal debates are going to be based.
To illustrate this last point, the need to clarify, extend, or modify current legal practice, w e take an example from Google's history, w here the courts have been attempting to rule on a current business practice that w as not anticipated w hen relevant legislation w as drafted, and w here the courts have specifically requested that Congress provide more explicit guidance. We use this example merely to illustrate the need for additional regulatory clarity; w e w ill not stress this example in the body of this paper. The intent of the Lanham A ct (also know n informally as the Trademark A ct) w as clear: (1) to prevent consumer confusion by restricting the use of brands and trademarks to their legitimate ow ners and (2) to increase the quality of products offered to consumers by providing incentives for companies to invest in their brands. The Trademark A ct is very specific about the protections it affords a brand, providing that no company can use another company's trademark for commercial purposes in a w ay that confuses or misguides consumers; the exact w ording, about using a competitor's trademark for commercial gain, is less clear today than w as believed w hen the A ct w as originally drafted. i In other w ords, it's clear from the statute that a company cannot put a Coke label on a can of Pepsi or even on a machine that sells Pepsi and not Coke. Unfortunately, w ith today's online business models, w ith sale of trademarks and optimization of search engine relative positioning, there are many opportunities to use trademarks in w ays that w ere not anticipated and thus now much about the bill that is no longer clear.
H ow does this act inform us in assessing w hether or not a search engine operator's sale of keyw ords is or should be legitimate? By selling trademarks it does not ow n in a keyw ord auction search engines are certainly using the trademarks of other companies for their ow n commercial gain, although in a w ay not anticipated by the framers of the Trademark A ct. A s certainly, by selling a company's trademark to a competitor for use in the competitor's marketing efforts, may in some sense be the equivalent of putting Coke logo's on a Pepsi machine that it operates, but again it w as acting in a w ay that w as not anticipated by the drafters of the Trademark A ct. This may be like misdirecting Coke's customers to a Pepsi machine, but in general properly labeling the machine w hen the customers actually arrive. A t present it is unclear if this is the legal equivalent of mislabeling the vending machine, or indeed if it should be.
So does sale of registered trademarks as search terms violate the Trademark A ct? The courts initially decided it did not in the Rescuecom case [87] , but in Google's first major legal setback this w as reversed by the Second Circuit Court of A ppeals. The Court claimed that this practice could not have been endorsed by the framers of the A ct; as importantly, they requested more clear and more modern and relevant guidance from Congress. Google has lost trademark cases in Europe [59] and, more recently, has w on Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural cases as w ell [72] . The issue is further complicated by the fact that Rescuecom has subsequently dropped its suit against Google [52] , so resolution of ambiguity w ill not come from the Rescuecom case.
When w e need a specific instance w e focus on Google in this study, largely for the same reasons that the authors of previous cases focused on Capital One in the case study of screening mechanisms in banking as a test of the new ly vulnerable markets hypothesis [32] , on M cKesson Drug in the case study of the strategic necessity hypothesis in drug distribution [31] , or the case study of the London Stock Exchange after its automation made it the first major securities market to abandon its trading floor [33] . These w ere important early exemplars of emerging trends, trends w ith lessons beyond the individual company studied, and indeed beyond the industry in which these exemplars competed. Google is the search engine w ith the largest market share, has been involved in more litigation, and is facing more discussion of regulation. It is, indeed, the best example w e could find for assessing the future of A merican regulation of digital businesses.
Google has announced its intention to defend itself against any and all litigation. In fact, Google's 10-K filing for 2008 indicates that their general and administrative expenses increased from $1.279.3 billion in 2007 to $1.802.6 billion in 2008. A s they note, " This increase w as primarily related to an increase in professional services of $243.0 million, the majority of w hich w ere related to legal costs ..." [46] . For instance, rather than concede on the sensitive issue of trademark abuse, Google has announced that it intends to extend its policy (as described on its w ebsite) on allow ing companies to bid for the right to use other companies' trademarks in its A dSense and A dWords auctions [92] . It is clear that Google is prepared to challenge ambiguities and anachronisms in commercial jurisprudence, making this an ideal w ay to approach an understanding of the strengths and possible limitations of current regulatory practice. It is equally clear that regulators and legislators need to respond w ith a clear understanding of the economics of digital businesses and the risks and benefits to consumers implicit in new digital strategies.
Specific I ssues Addressed in Our Research
We address the follow ing five areas, informed by legal doctrine, but from the perspective of information economics:
1. Presence of M onopoly: When is a new digital business model an extension to previous products or services competing w ith them for share of an existing market, and w hen is it radical enough to represent a business in its ow n right, and not a substitute for other companies' historical offerings?
2. Presence of M onopoly Power: When do you know that you have monopoly pow er and a monopoly ability to set prices?
3. Abuse of M onopoly Power: H ow can you tell w hen monopoly pow er has been abused, causing harm to consumers, competitors, or to the very process of 4. Applicability and Efficacy of Existing Legal Remedies: When can monopoly pow er be limited through the legal system? Traditionally, monopoly pow er has been prosecuted only w hen it is obtained illegally, in order to rew ard entrepreneurial creativity; monopoly pow er obtained through innovation and excellence has generally been held to be legal. In rare instances, monopoly pow er w as considered to be a fundamental property of an industry, as it w as w ith 19th and 20th century telephony, prior to easy interconnectivity among competing service providers; in that case the concept of a regulated natural monopoly w as introduced.
5. N eed for Fundamental Regulatory Change: Do third party payer digital business models, as exemplified by paid search, require intervention as profound as the Justice Department's intervention against A T& T in The Kingsbury Commitment? We believe that each of these questions is best addressed from the perspective of information economics, and indeed, information economics w ill be necessary to guide and inform the development of appropriate law .
Throughout this paper w e w ill use the term economics to mean micro-economics and the analysis of the decisions of consumers w ho are maximizing their w elfare and firms that are maximizing their profits. Consumers decide how much to w ork and at w hat jobs, and w hat to purchase and how much to purchase of the goods and services on offer. Firms decide w hat to produce, how to produce it, and w hat quantities to offer, based on their assessment of the decisions of consumers and of other firms.
Overview of Principal Areas of Legal D octrine Used in Our Analyses
The principal legal issues w e use to support our information economic analyses are listed below . This short introduction is not intended to detail the logic or to present either current statutes or jurisprudence and litigation history. It is intended to guide the reader through w hat w ill follow and to allow the reader w ho is less familiar w ith antitrust or w ith legal reasoning to impose some structure on the paper as he or she reads through the text:
• Relevant M arket Share -How would you know if you were dealing with a monopoly? You start by determining w hat the relevant market is, and then examine the company's share of that market. For example, is Google just another advertising company or is it the dominant player in search? Similarly, the Department of Justice (DoJ) needed to determine if M icrosoft w as just another softw are firm or if it w as the dominant player in operating systems for Intel-based personal computers? This is essential to determining if a company has monopoly pow er.
• Electronic D istribution and the Essential Facilities D octrine -Is search a form of advertising, or is it better view ed as a form of electronic distribution, w ith its ow n economics and business model, quite separate from advertising? Is search an essential facility, one that indeed not only can augment advertising but in a real sense can trump it by redirect customers aw ay from one w ell-advertised brand and to competitors? Does control over search confer enormous and perhaps irresistible market pow er and pricing pow er in the sale of keyw ords? Does this pow er even survive the presence of viable competitors, allow ing the formation of " parallel monopolies" , each w ith monopoly pricing pow er? Does the seller of an essential facility have monopoly pow er even if the price is set through a market auction? A lternatively, perhaps none of these questions is relevant. Does essential facilities doctrine even apply, since historically it has been used to regulate transactions betw een competitors: The doctrine may have been applicable in disputes betw een M CI and A T& T or betw een airlines and the reservations systems ow ned by competing airlines, but is it applicable in disputes betw een Google and its bidders, w hich are firms in very different industries? This is essential to determining if a company has monopoly pow er even in the absence of monopoly market share. It is also relevant to determining if a company has been behaving as a monopolist.
• Bundling, Subsidies, and the Potential Stifling of Competition -Is the giving aw ay of products, bundled (as Internet Explorer w as w ith Window s) or standalone (as gM ail is w ith search) necessarily a form of predatory pricing, does it stifle competition, and is it alw ays associated w ith a potentially predatory monopoly? While giving products aw ay w ithout charge is not illegal, giving products aw ay to develop a monopoly position to be exploited later is indeed illegal. When foreign firms engage in this practice w ithin the United States it is called dumping and it is indeed prosecuted. While the tight interaction of products and services is beneficial to consumers, bundling, tying, and crosssubsidies may harm future competition, even if no present competitor and no present consumer can demonstrate harm. A ntitrust law does indeed permit prosecution of actions that harm the competitive process, even if no consumers and no firms have yet been directly harmed.
ii This is useful w hen determining if a company has been behaving as a monopolist or is positioning itself to behave as a monopolist in the future, or both.
• Separation of Payer and User in a Platform that Constitutes an Essential Facility -Third party payer business models did not originate w ith the Internet, but they may so thoroughly decouple pricing from the discipline of the market, and they may now become so prevalent among Internet firms, as to require a change in regulatory philosophy. Google's business model is only the latest example of a third party payer platform; earlier examples included Sabre and A pollo as computerized travel agent reservation systems. In the third-party payer model, the provider of the platform (party one) provides an essential service to the user community (party tw o) w ithout charge, w hile charging a third party for participation (party three), in this instance charging searchers nothing to search w hile charging the third party fees in order to be present and thus in The paper advances the follow ing legal arguments:
• Google may enjoy monopoly pow er in search, w hich is the relevant market for consideration, and not advertising.
• Search may be a form of electronic distribution, like travel agent reservations systems, and search may be an essential facility, one to w hich companies must have access if their business requires that they can be found by consumers.
• Search engines' third party payer business model may free their keyw ord auctions from the effective discipline of the market; that is, prices in the auction may be limited by the value of the contact to the firm bidding for auction terms, not by the value of search to the consumer if the consumer is not paying.
Ow ners of such essential facilities may enjoy monopoly pricing pow er in the presence of parallel monopolies, rather than pure monopolies, because if some consumers only use Google then it is essential to be present in Google, even if Yahoo w ere available at a low er price.
• A nd if the above are true, and if Google uses even a small portion of its monopoly profits to provide incentives to consumers to remain w ith Google, then this business model w ill remain stable even if prices charged to corporations are extraordinarily high, further increasing consumers' reliance upon Google. A gain, if consumers are induced to stay, and consumers are not the ones paying for search, there is no discipline imposed upon the price of search by the market.
• Finally, if the above are true, and if Google uses a significant portion of its monopoly profits to underw rite other ventures, it may be able to engage in subsidized preemptive line extensions, increasing consumer choice initially but restricting future competition.
The rest of the paper provides some context on search engine providers, and on Google specifically, and then examines the legal arguments that w ould need to be used to assess each of the points above.
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural 
Essential D isclaimers
It is essential to note the follow ing disclaimers w hile reading this paper.
• We are not describing w hy Google should face antitrust litigation
• We are not describing w hy Google should lose antitrust litigation
• We are not describing or seeking to quantify the precise economic damages that may be caused by Google
• We are describing w hat the central issues in any litigation may entail, w ithin the context of current antitrust jurisprudence, if indeed such litigation occurs, to highlight the areas w here regulatory change may be necessary.
M ost importantly, w e are describing specific areas in w hich current jurisprudence may prove inadequate, leading to groundbreaking disputes over appropriate extensions.
Indeed, Google also believes that the issues raised here are those that they w ill face in court, if indeed, this ever goes to court. Like any firm that is responsible to interests of their investors, they are preemptively attempting to put the best possible spin on them, through press releases (e.g., [50] ) and meetings w ith major new spapers (e.g., Burns, [13] ). N ot surprisingly, they also have an extensive lobbying budget [55] . The analysis presented here can help provide an understanding of w hy antitrust litigation w ill or w ill not be brought against Google, and can help provide an understanding of the arguments that w ill unfold and the decisions that w ill need to be made if such antitrust proceedings commence.
M any of these issues are still in flux, like the explicit meanings of and limits to applicability of bundling and tying or essential facilities doctrine, w ith the courts continuing to redefine, clarify, and alter interpretations. Litigation is likely not only to be shaped by decades of legal history on the issues mentioned in our review of specific issues above, but also is likely to shape antitrust regulation and jurisprudence for next several decades as w ell. For that reason the view s of those of us w ho study information economics, business strategy, and modern competition may suddenly and at least briefly now be as relevant as the view s of antitrust law yers in the shaping of A merica's antitrust policies.
When the issue of economics is addressed by litigators, it is usually in the context of quantifying damages, w hich is usually based on some form of accounting, cost accounting, or but-for analysis. (But-for analysis" is a means of assessing how the w orld w ould have been, but-for a specific action, in order to assess w hether or not harm has occurred and the extent of any resulting harm. In general, concrete econometrics or simulation modeling is required, and fanciful analyses are generally not permitted, such as for " For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of a horse the rider was lost … ," w hich try to blame the blacksmith for the fall of a kingdom.) Rather, the discussion of economics here is intended to highlight that economics drives business strategy, w hich is constrained or channeled by law , to achieve broad social 
Structure of The Paper
The structure of this paper is as follow s:
• We first explain our interest in Google as the most successful example of a third party payer digital business, and presents a quick review of the company and its business model.
• We next explain the concept of relevant market share, essential to the DoJ's case against M icrosoft, and likely to be central to any DoJ action involving Google.
• We examine electronic distribution in the context of the essential facilities doctrine and asks if the regulation of essential facilities needs to be rethought or extended in order to deal explicitly w ith electronic distribution channels.
• We examine w hether there is any evidence that Google has monopoly pow er or is exploiting monopoly pow er: (1) What are Google's current business practices, can it set its ow n prices for search terms, and does it bias search in a w ay that damages consumers? (2) Does it have extraordinary market pow er? (3) Does its ability to provide for cross-subsidies for other lines of business strengthen the argument for monopoly pow er? (4) Do these cross subsidies help or harm competition by increasing or decreasing consumer choice? (5) Do these cross subsidies violate prohibitions bundling and tying or any other existing legal doctrines?
• We consider w hether or not there is sufficient possibility of consumer harm to justify the Department of Justice's considering bringing an antitrust case against Google. We examine both current harm, due to consumer confusion, inferior purchases, or higher prices, and future harm, due to harm to the competitive process and reduction in future choice, reduction in future innovation, or higher prices in the future. It concludes by considering if it appears that these cross subsidies harm competition and that the monopoly pow er that created them w as obtained legally, is it necessary to provide new regulatory guidance or w ill the existing legal framew ork prove adequate to provide judicial relief?
• Finally, w e present our conclusions regarding the five issues raised in the review of specific issues above, examines limitations of this w ork and directions for future research.
This paper does not explicitly consider the possibility of private antitrust law suits, brought either by competitors or by customers. We had considered customer law suits unlikely because of the oft-stated fear of retaliation by Google or by costs associated w ith such litigation, until w e recently became aw are of Tradecomet.com v. Google [75] .
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural The requirements for a private suit w ould be different w ith respect to standing and to a degree w ould be more difficult to satisfy, iii but the essential logic needed to support the litigation w ould be similar to that w hich w e expect w ould be pursued by the Department of Justice, and the problems interpreting current law and legal practice likew ise w ould be similar.
An Overview of Google and its Business M odel
Google is certainly an Internet success story, w ith 60% or more of the US market for Internet search; recent estimates range from a low of 67% to a high of 77% [22] , [45] , [68] , and do not appear to be dropping significantly since the launch of M icrosoft's Bing. The company does not break out profit margins by lines of business, but w ith an operating margin in excess of 35% for the company as a w hole [93] , and w ith virtually all profits coming from search, profit margins from search are extraordinarily high. Likew ise, profits from search have funded its expansion into a range of semi-related and unrelated activities. Google is not only one of the most profitable companies on the net, but it is one of the most admired companies in A merica, having done a marvelous job of managing its public image. It has found a business model that allow s it to provide a product to one set of customers (users performing search) w ithout charge, w hile having another set of customers to pay very high prices (companies desiring to be found) to subsidize the services offered to the searchers, adding to the firm's popularity.
Google's model is w orking: Simple financials provide one indication. With gross profits of $13.17 billion on sales of $23.65 billion, w ith profit margins of 27.57% and return on equity of 20.30%, and w ith a cash horde of $24.48 billion, Google truly is the successful giant among search engines. The equivalent figures for Yahoo, Google's closest competitor in search, are gross profits of $4.19 billion on sales of $6.46 billion, profit margins of 9.26% and a return on equity of 5.04%, and cash on hand of $3.29 billion [93] .
Google has a w ide range of other business activities, not all related to search, w hich can be view ed on its w ebsite (w w w .google.com/ options/ ).
• Tw enty three of these are related to search beyond its traditional search engine, including commercial (Checkout), scholarly (Scholar), image-focused (Images) and map-based (M aps, Earth) and special purpose (finance, patent). Google now offers its ow n brow ser under this category as w ell (Chrome).
• A nother fourteen are aimed at communications and sharing. These are largely free to their users.
• Three more are aimed at mobile users. Google's users are extraordinarily loyal and vocal [70] :
• " Government touches google = we revolt… this is sacred ground people!"
• " What if GOOGLE broke up the GOVERNM ENT, would be a more interesting story"
• " Don't you dare touch Google? It's personal."
• " I don't think that GOOGLE should be worried about the GOVERNM ENT … now vice versa…"
• " They can take my Google when they pry the keyboard from my cold, dead hands."
Clearly, by any measure, this is a popular company, and Google believes that this may help deter or soften antitrust action.
Whether despite or because of its popularity, Google is now attracting unw anted attention from a range of sources. Some authors are beginning to question the stability of a business based on attracting online ad revenues (e.g., [53] ), and some even consider the possibility that online community content may eventually replace much of Google's online advertising [24] , [25] , [27] , [39] . M oreover, the general tone of press coverage now regularly addresses the risks facing the company from antitrust litigation (e.g., [18] , [21] , [57] , [65] , [70] ), and the anger of corporate participants in Google's auctions (e.g., [18] , [64] , [69] ), and even concerns over Google's appropriating the content of others w ithout compensation [64] .
Relevant M arket Share The Concept of Relevant M arket
Relevant market share is assessed by first determining w hat the market for a product or service product is, and then by determining w hat percentage of that market that product or service has captured. This sounds unambiguous, but determining the set of alternatives, direct competitor and substitute products, can be quite complex. One local N ew York or Philadelphia national netw ork affiliate is probably clearly substitutable for another as venues for advertising. H ow ever, the substitutability of The New York Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Wall Street Journal, of Fortune M agazine, Time M agazine, and The Economist, or of the H istory Channel, The Golf Channel, and The Food Channel is less clear; indeed, these latter alternatives to a television netw ork affiliate probably need to be arrayed in a tw o dimensional space, w ith one axis indicating the target audience and another axis indicating the degree of substitutability. global economy. It is a larger portion of the technology sector, a larger portion still of computing hardw are and softw are, and an even larger portion of the market for all softw are. M ost importantly, it is a huge portion of the Intel operating system market. During trial, M icrosoft tried to argue it w as about 3% of the softw are market; opposing them, the DoJ and David Boies argued that it w as closer to 90% of the relevant market, the market at the time for operating systems for Intel-based machines.
The concept of relevant market share w as so critical in M icrosoft antitrust litigation that it is nearly certain to be relevant here as w ell in assessing how important Google search is to firms' access to their customers iv . A s Schmalensee notes [67] , follow ing A reeda and Turner While M icrosoft argued that the relevant market w as the market for all softw are, the DoJ argued that the relevant market w as the market for all operating systems softw are for Intel platform computers. While M icrosoft's share of the global softw are market may be quite small, its share of personal computer softw are is larger, and its share of operating systems sales for machines based on the Intel platform w as at the time nearly 100%. Indeed, based on these statistics, M icrosoft and its w itnesses w ere very reluctant to see any definition of relevant markets accepted during the trial; in his first 65 pages of testimony Professor Schmalensee refused to accept the utility or importance of the concept in this trial, and argued that virtually any piece of softw are might ultimately emerge as a viable competitor for M icrosoft's OS [76] . We can expect similar resistance from Google to the definition of online search as the relevant market for online search, and a similar need for clarification of w hat constitutes advertising and w hat does not in an era of digital acquisition of information before shopping.
The Lessons of Share of Relevant M arket from The M icrosoft Trial
Just as M icrosoft represents only a small portion of the global economy, Google is a small portion of the global economy. It is, of course, a larger portion of the Internet economy, and it is a huge portion of the market for Internet search. Google is now trying to argue it is less than 3% of the advertising market [50] ; how ever, if it w ere show n that search is not a form of advertising, that advertising is not substitutable for participation in search, and indeed that keyw ord auctions can trump or devalue traditional advertising, then the relevant market w ill not be seen as all of advertising. Consequently, if Google is subject to antitrust action, the DoJ w ill almost certainly have to argue that the relevant market is online search, and that Google possesses betw een 60% and 70% of this relevant market. Google accepts the importance of this distinction, and w hile it acknow ledges that it currently captures 72% of the revenue for search advertising, it represents only 30% of online advertising and less than 3% of all advertising revenues. This information is taken w ith permission from Google's presentations at The Wharton School on 1 M arch 2010.
Sponsored search exemplifies the complexity of identifying relevant markets w hen assessing new products and services, especially w hen these new offerings can be framed in terms of more traditional predecessors. We are not suggesting that Google calls its business a form of advertising to deceive either consumers or the courts. Initially, its customers, companies that could be induced to bid for keyw ords, understood advertising and had budgets for advertising; there could not have been a better w ay to position the business for initial adoption by corporate bidders.
I s Search Just Advertising?
Google calls its profitable businesses Adwords and Adsense. Why aren't these just forms of advertising, and w hy isn't relevant market just advertising in all its forms and utilizing all available media?
But w e know w hat advertising is. A dvertising presents material to you w hile you are doing something else, such as presenting an ad on the low er half of the printed w hile you are reading the Times, making you navigate through a screen you encounter before you enter Forbes's online w ebsite, or interrupting w ith a TV a commercial you view w hile w atching the Super Bow l. A dvertising creates a desire to buy now , or a sense of trust in a brand that leads to buying later [24] , [25] . The best advertising leaves you w ith a clear and memorable image of the firm that sponsored it, like "We love to fly and it shows (American Airlines),"or "Smart. Very Smart! (Holiday Inn Express)" or "Just do it! (Nike)".
These ads are much less useful if the customers search for a product after seeing the companies' ad, only to be redirected and to end up at a competitor's w ebsite. We believe that advertising is not a substitute for search, anymore than a personal computer ow ner can substitute Photoshop or SA P in place of Vista or Window s. Search is thus different from advertising [24] , and not an alternative for advertising, but a means of rendering advertising less important, perhaps even irrelevant [25] . Paid search allow s a company to take temporary possession of a competitor's brand, so that if a user searches on M arriott M arquis or InterContinental London they can send the user to a bidder for keyw ords like " M arriott" , " M arquis" , or " InterContinental" , not necessarily the ow ner of the brand. The distinction betw een search and advertising in the definition of the relevant market may be crucial to any future antitrust litigation against Google. If search is a form of electronic distribution, and if electronic distribution can provide monopoly pow er even w ith market share below one third of the market, then Google may be show n to have monopoly pow er, just as travel agent confirmed by the courts in 1985 [62] . Specifically, the court stated, " Though no airline has a monopoly market share, that is not required by section 411" ( [77] at 1114.)
The definition of Google's product -w hether or not it is a form of advertisingremains contested, and resolving this w ill again be crucial to the decision in any future antitrust trial of search engine providers. This w ill continue to be debated, since redirection, and even misdirection, as alternative forms of customer acquisition are simply too pow erful for the courts to ignore. The history of acquisition through misdirection certainly predates the age of electronic marketing [10] . N eedless to say, the British courts did not view this example, w hich involved using false lighthouses as signals to redirect ships onto reefs w here they could be plundered, as advertising, or as any other legitimate form of business.
Google, of course, sees things differently, and argues that placing an ad for a sponsored product above the product for w hich the consumer is searching is little different from placing a store branded mouthw ash next to Listerine, in a bottle size, shape, and color as much like Listerine's as possible. In Rescuecom, Google argued that " use of the Rescuecom trademark is no different from that of a retail vendor w ho uses " product placement" to allow one vender to benefit from a competitors' name recognition [49] . A n example of product placement occurs w hen a store-brand generic product is placed next to a trademarked product to induce a customer w ho specifically sought out the trademarked product to consider the typically less expensive, generic brand as an alternative." Little in the history of advertising or of more traditional physical product placement prepares the courts to address this issue.
D irection, M isdirection, and Redirection Explained
What does it mean to say the searcher " gets sent somew here else" ? Definitions of several terms may help (numbers in the text correspond to the numbered arrow s in figure 1, w hich follow s):
• Organic Search (1) -The results of a search returned because Google's algorithms suggest that these are the most relevant item for the user, based on the terms in his or her search.
• Sponsored Search (2) -The result of a search returned because a sponsor bid enough for key w ords that appeared in the user's search sequence. These terms may be generic (e.g., London, hotel), obviously brand names (e.g., M arriott), or more ambiguous (e.g., H oliday, Inn). The term may appear because the sponsor w as the highest bidder, or, increasingly, because the sponsor bid enough, and Google determined that this is the company that the user w ould have w anted to see, even in the absence of bidding. It may not alw ays be obvious to the user that these are sponsored search results.
• M ap Ads (3) -These are the URLs that appear next to a map returned in response to the user's search.
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural • Ads (4) -These are terms that appear off to the right of the organic and sponsored search results. M ost users are easily able to identify these as ads. Like sponsored search, these results appear because companies purchased keyw ords, and these keyw ords w ere used in a user's search string, triggering the appearance of the ad.
• Scam Ads (Not shown) -This term is poorly defined, but the concept has some industry participants very concerned [69] . Basically, a scam ad (or scads) appears to be a URL sponsored by the trademark ow ner, but is actually the sponsored URL for a different company, either a competitor, or a third party reseller that sells many competing brands and may or may not actually represent the ow ner of the trademark. These can appear among sponsored search results, map ads, or ads. A s a consequence of sponsored search, map ads, and outright deceptive scam ads, even if the user is searching for a specific company or a specific product, using the relevant brand name as a keyw ord, he or she may end up clicking on someone else's URL unless the firm that ow ns the brand has chosen pay and to participate in Google's keyw ord auction.
Both Google and its supporters argue that the presence of sponsored search and ads greatly increases consumer choice by suggesting items consumers may not have know n existed, thus making consumers aw are of numerous additional alternatives; increasing consumer choice, it is argued, improves the consumer shopping experience. This argument has some value, but it is both simplistic and, itself, misleading. M any firms offer suggestion facilities. A mazon, for example, has a recommender system that is fair and honest, based on collaborative filtering, and requires no expensive bidding; A mazon's system also is clear and not misleading, and its suggestions are obviously labeled as recommendations, not as alternatives that appear above the item that the customer requested. It is clear by comparison w ith A mazon that this model w ould be far less profitable for Google, but it w ould be far less expensive for corporations and for consumers w ho ultimately pay the increased costs of Google search that are passed through as higher consumer prices. Obviously, neither Google nor any other search engine has any incentive to provide a free recommender service, but it is useful to note that recommender services and paid search are not equivalent.
Electronic D istribution and Essential Facilities I ntroduction to the Essential Facilities D octrine
The essential facilities doctrine provides that a monopolist or a near monopolist that controls a facility that cannot be duplicated by competitors must provide access to the facility if it is feasible to do so ([58] at 1132). " Specifically, four elements must be satisfied to establish liability under the essential facilities: (1) control of the essential facility by the monopolist; (2) competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) feasibility of providing the facility [58] . The essential facilities doctrine has evolved through legal history and jurisprudence and it is a matter of common law rather than the result of specific legislation. For a more detailed treatment see [37] . The Supreme Court has never recognized the essential facilities doctrine although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest that it is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence. . We w ill return to this in our exploration of the uncertain future of the essential facilities doctrine, below .
Overview of Electronic D istribution as An Essential Facility
If search is not a form of advertising, w hat is it? We believe that Google's business model is a form of electronic distribution, or a form of paying for customer access, and w e believe that this form of electronic distribution and customer access is an essential facility. Indeed, the argument w e w ill present in our review of prior experience w ith electronic distribution suggest that this business model is largely analogous to that of the travel agent reservations systems in the 1980s.
• When United A irlines w anted to take over Denver as its new domestic southw estern hub it redirected passengers aw ay from Frontier and tow ards its ow n flights, using its travel agent reservations system, A pollo.
• When A merican A irlines w anted to take over Dallas / Fort Worth as its new domestic southw estern hub it redirected passengers aw ay from Braniff and tow ards its ow n flights, using its travel agent reservations system, Sabre.
• Both Frontier and Braniff filed for bankruptcy, United captured its Denver hub and A merican acquired Dallas Fort Worth. The pow er of these reservations systems w as also then clear to other airlines, allow ing Sabre and A pollo enormous freedom in pricing their CRS services.
Prior Experience with Electronic D istribution as an Essential Facility
Travel agents, Orbitz, and travel agent distribution systems like A madeus and Galileo (formerly Sabre and A pollo) do not advertise airlines, they book flights. Similarly, it's difficult to argue that search engines strengthen any brand w hen they sell trademarks like H oliday Inn or Dove. Rather, search engines direct customers, selling access, and acting more like a distribution service. Brands are created and strengthened through product innovation, quality of service, and advertising. Quite orthogonal to that, brands may now acquire distribution and customers through distribution services available to any bidder. A n ad in The New York Times may strengthen a brand, but even this does not help the trademark holder much, if search directs a searcher to a competing brand.
M onopoly pow er in electronic distribution channels is often difficult to assess since the relationship betw een market share and market pow er may be deceptive, and even counter-intuitive. Tw o historical examples that w ere subjects of much earlier research provide the best w ay to begin the analysis, because their economic implications are now very clear [23] , [26] , [29] .
In the early 1980s A merican A irlines' Sabre and United A irlines' A pollo computerized reservations systems (CRSs) already dominated the market for travel agency reservations systems, w ith 43% and 27% market share respectively [36] . A t the time 80% of air travel bookings w ere made through travel agencies. Thus, w hile neither Sabre nor A pollo accounted for a majority of any airline's bookings, even the smaller of the tw o controlled access to approximately 20% of every airline's potential customers and therefore approximately 20% of every airline's sales.
The historical record makes it clear that the CRSs had market pow er at the time. When A pollo dropped Frontier from its reservations systems, Frontier w as forced to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11; it reemerged, regained listings in A pollo, and continues to fly. When Sabre, w hich w as larger than A pollo, dropped Braniff, Braniff also filed for bankruptcy and no longer operates. Clearly, Sabre and A pollo enjoyed considerable market pow er and clearly this pow er became evident to all airlines even if it w as not immediately perceived by passengers or even by agencies. Ultimately, both A merican and United w ere earning more from booking flights on other airlines than from their ow n operations, and at one point A merican w as earning more from booking passengers on Delta's flights than Delta w as earning by operating them.
N either Sabre nor A pollo had a monopoly of the market for reservations services, but together each had a parallel monopoly on the share of the market that they served Interestingly, even w ith 100% of the market for inter-bank A TM sw itching services, PN B lacked monopoly pow er, w as unable to charge excessive fees to its member banks, and never represented a competitive threat to the other banks in Philadelphia. This can be seen from figure 3. The analysis for figures 2 and 3 is largely derived from our earlier w ork [22] . These figures first appeared in the Financial Times in 2006 and w ere reused in TechCrunch [26] , [30] . From these pictures w e see that the geometries of the tw o netw orks -CRS services and A TM services -are quite different. The CRSs are positioned betw een the airlines and their passengers. If one CRS drops an airline then all agencies that use the CRS and all of that agency's customers are denied access to one (and only one) airline. The agency may not care, and the customers may not even know . M oreover, bypass of the CRS at the time, before the presence of search engines and online booking, meant that the lost business w as likely to be impossible to recapture as long as participation in the CRS w as denied. Despite the high fees, no airline voluntarily removed itself from any CRS [36] .
In contrast, each bank is positioned betw een its customers and the A TM netw ork service provider M A C. If a bank is denied access to the netw ork, at least its ow n cards w ill w ork on its ow n machines. M oreover, each bank used an identical interface in its communications w ith M A C. Therefore the banks w ere able to forge an alliance -if PN B attempted to compete unfairly against any one of them, they w ould simply implement bilateral sw itching among themselves and cut M A C out entirely.
A gain, even w ith 100% market share, there w ere no complaints of abuse lodged against M A C by member banks [29] . In contrast, there w ere significant complaints lodged against the operators of the CRSs and, ultimately, rule changes from the Civil A eronautics Board (w hose responsibility w as later transferred to the Department of Transportation after the CA B w as eliminated in 1984), severely limited the pow er of the CRS operators. These rule changes w ere subsequently confirmed by the 7th Circuit [77] . The reasoning of the decision explicitly acknow ledges the CRSs as essential facilities [36] .
A s show n in figure 4 , the geometry of the diagram looks strikingly similar to that of the airline reservations systems, w ith portals (AOL, etc.) in the position of travel agents, search engines in the position of CRSs, and sellers in the position that corresponds to airlines. The principal difference, w hich turns out to be largely irrelevant to our argument, is that some users do go to Google.com or Yahoo.com to enter their search rather than use their home page search box w hen searching. Still, most users have a default search engine and most do not sw itch search engines.
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural Perhaps the greatest mistake an airline could have made w hen dealing w ith A pollo and Sabre w as thinking that they had a choice of w hether or not to participate; they had to participate, and they had to pay w hatever prices Sabre and A pollo demanded. A nd despite recommendations to consider your strategy carefully (see, for example, " What's Your Google Strategy?" [47] ) manufacturers, retailers, and service providers w ho need to be found by their customers do not need and indeed cannot have a strategy for dealing w ith Google in the sense described by the article's authors; those that w ish to survive w ill indeed continue to participate in Google and Yahoo's keyw ord auctions.
Google's market share for sponsored search and for search generally is larger than the share Sabre or A pollo enjoyed. The conditions are right for Google to enjoy enormous market pow er over service providers, w ho feel they must bid for positions in Google's sponsored search keyw ord auctions.
Offsetting the fact that Google's market share advantage in search is greater than that w hich Sabre and A pollo once enjoyed is the fact that alternative routes into hotel reservations systems exist. Customers can call the hotel or the chain's reservations systems, or can use the hotel's w ebsite, the chain's w ebsite, or other third party w ebsites.
The Uncertain Future of the Essential Facilities D octrine.
We are not sure that the essential facilities doctrine, as it is evolving, w ill even be seen to be relevant by the time a trial might occur. The Supreme Court has never recognized the essential facilities doctrine, although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest that it is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence, as discussed above.
We do believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine w ill prove useful and valid. payment by companies that w ish to be found effectively removes this essential facility from the discipline of market pricing, as it likew ise did for reservations systems vendors. Both regulators and the courts felt that reservations systems required regulation, and w e believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine w ill provide the rationale for recoupling search engine vendors to the discipline of the markets.
A s it is currently understood, there are four elements that must be satisfied in order to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine:
1. M onopoly control of the essential facility, w ith w hat is currently understood as monopoly market share for the industry in question.
2. Competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility.
3. Unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a competitor.
Feasibility of providing the facility.
(See e.g., [58] at 1132 .)
A lthough the essential facilities framew ork is applied in analyzing " refusals to deal" betw een competitors, the follow ing analysis show s how the current essential facilities doctrine might be applied to Google and to illustrate the shortcomings of essential facilities doctrine w ith respect to electronic distribution netw orks and paid search as the doctrine is currently understood:
1. There is no doubt that Google controls its search engine and certainly " guides" advertisers and competitors of trademarked brands in selecting those keyw ords. 2. A s described above, w hat prevents companies that object to paying for Google search is in part a function of the third party payer model, and in part a function of the nature of search itself. N o user w ants a search engine from M arriott, and another from H yatt, and another from Delta airlines, any more than a travel agent w anted a CRS from each airline that had a grievance w ith Sabre or A pollo; competition w ill only come from an alternative generic search engine w ith the full capabilities of Google. A nd no user has a strong incentive to leave Google as long as Google is " cheaper than free," any more than an agency had a reason to leave Sabre and A pollo w hen they w ere receiving large payments in the form of negative rents (again, called overrides in the industry) for using Sabre and A pollo.
3. Since Google does not deny access to search to any firm that is w illing to pay the demanded price for keyw ords it may appear that the essential facilities doctrine does not apply. We examine this fourth point, the pricing of an essential facility and the possibility that Google could offer low er prices, in the examination of the possibility of predatory pricing, immediately follow ing. M ost importantly, essential facilities arguments w ere historically offered only w hen contesting firms w here in the same industry. Both A T& T and M CI w ere telecommunications companies, and A merican and Braniff w ere both airlines. The use w e are proposing for essential facilities adheres to the four points generally required, but remains novel since Google and the bidders for key w ords are not competitors. The courts could indeed decide that Google has no obligation to provide search terms (that is, access to the facility of search) at low er prices. We explore this, and the possible need for novel antitrust jurisprudence below , w hen w e ask " Is N ew Legal Doctrine Required to Permit A ction?" and " Is A dditional Regulation A ctually N eeded?" . This has recently become more ambiguous, since the preliminary probe launched by the European Commission " into its dominant position in online brow sing and digital advertising follow ing allegations that it demotes competing w ebsites" in search results listings; in other w ords, that it denies competitors access to an essential facility [21] .
A gain, w e are aw are that w e are going beyond traditional and generally accepted use of essential facilities doctrine. For instance, A reeda & Turner caution that the doctrine should " at most" extend to " facilities that are a natural monopoly, facilities w hose duplication is forbidden by law , and perhaps those that are publicly subsidized and thus could not practicably be built privately" ( [5] , ¶ 736.2b at 680-81). While Google is not a natural monopoly and its market share is less than the near-100% of local loop access that A T& T controlled, it is significantly higher than the share that Sabre or A pollo enjoyed. A nd again, w e w ill argue in below that the parallel monopoly construct present in electronic distribution and the decoupling of search term prices from the discipline of the market, may require extensions to regulatory structures, much as the introduction of the now accepted concept of natural monopoly did w hen it w as required to deal w ith the emergence of A T& T. Once again, the courts could indeed decide that a parallel monopoly is no monopoly at all, that third party payer models are irrelevant, and that if present search providers' prices are too high any or all bidders could abandon them.
Google should, and w ill, argue that paid search does not constitute an essential facility; users can find anything they w ant through organic search, or by calling an organization after finding it in the yellow pages. A irlines argued similarly that a traveler could make a hotel or airline reservation by bypassing their travel agencies and calling the company's toll-free phone number, or in the case of hotels, by calling individual properties directly. M ost did not. While the courts w ill be the final arbiters of any change in antitrust policy to accommodate search and third party payer models, w e feel that information economists are ideally suited to surface the critical new economic issues, and to provide guidance in this unfamiliar territory.
The Possibility of Predatory Pricing and The Possible Anti-Competitive Uses of Any Resulting Profits Google's Current Business Practices
Google has argued that its business practices are legitimate for three reasons: [16] , [17] Google chief economist H al Varian likew ise argues that prices for brands are not set through monopoly pricing but through auctions, so prices cannot be too high or firms w ould not pay them. H e also argues that companies w ith strong brands usually aren't paying very much for the use of their ow n brand names as keyw ords in their ads, because their ads are highly relevant to consumers and Google gives them a high quality score, allow ing them to w in even w ith low er bids. (The best source for this at the time w e finished our paper w as a YouTube posting, in w hich Dr. Varian described Google's auctions of search terms.)
The third point in the list above, that Google does not set prices and therefore by definition does not have monopoly pow er, seems inaccurate in a w ay that w ill prove critical to the future not only of Google but also to the future of antitrust regulation of third party payer mechanisms. If consumers w ere to spontaneously make the transition to an alternative search engine that ranked search results in the order implied by Google's internal measure of URL quality, consumers w ould be no w orse off and the market price for search terms w ould be precisely zero. Setting the price of search terms, or of any other essential facility, through competitive auction does not indicate the absence of monopoly pricing pow er. A lthough all analogies are dangerously imprecise, the sole vendor of life jackets on a sinking ocean liner may not strictly set prices unilaterally if he auctions them off, but these prices most definitely do reflect monopoly pow er. Likew ise, if there are numerous vendors, each w ith franchises that give them sole rights to sell life jackets on different sinking ships, then their market pow er is not diminished by the number of such vendors that exist throughout the A tlantic. A gain, analogies are imprecise, but multiple vendors of essential facilities can enjoy parallel monopolies and can be effectively divorced from the discipline of the market.
Google's policies do demonstrate sound business and economic analysis. Google has moved from " rank by bid" , w hich places the highest bidder on top, to " rank by revenue," w hich places the bidder most profitable for Google on top, usually the highest quality bidder, provider that bidder pays " enough" for the use of his ow n trademark as a search term (see, for example, Varian [88] for an explanation of rank by revenue). Indeed, rank-by-revenue has been universally adopted, not only by Google but also by competitors such as Yahoo and Bing.
In brief, Google most frequently places the items that they know users truly w ant atop the sponsored search list, ahead of the highest bidders, because this practice generates more clicks and more revenue for Google. That doesn't mean that the superior seller is alw ays placed at the head of the sponsored search list; the superior seller does have to bid w hat Google terms to be enough. This suggests (1) that in part Google does have the pow er to set prices and (2) Google does know enough to provide an alternative recommender system, if indeed it chose to do so in place of a sponsored search business.
Google's move to rank-by-revenue is beneficial for Google precisely because it is better for consumers than rank-by-bid. Consumers are more likely to find w hat they w ant than if Google still used rank-by-revenue, and are more likely to be satisfied w ith the URLs on w hich they click. This generates adequate consumer satisfaction. A s importantly, consistently providing consumers w ith high-bidding but poor quality sponsored search results w ould signal to consumers that the top spot may be w eak and that perhaps sponsored search should be ignored entirely. Since consumers deserting sponsored search w ould destroy Google's business model, it is not surprising that Google has found a w ay to maximize its revenue, maximize consumer satisfaction, and avoid discrediting its ow n business.
Google now returns search results largely in the order that you w ould get from free and natural organic search, w hile still charging companies billions of dollars for the use of search terms. It is hard to ignore the argument that receiving so much revenue, at such extraordinary margins, w ith such limited value added, is not at least suggestive of monopoly market power. This alone does not establish the presence of consumer harm, or indeed of any form of harm. Where stable business models combined w ith consumer satisfaction and clever revenue maximization ends, and w here exploitive monopoly pricing begins, is quite beyond the analytical abilities of the present authors, and indeed is an issue that is likely to confront the courts repeatedly in litigation over digital commerce models.
Possibility of H arm Enabled by Over-Charging in a N on-Contestable M arket
Relevant market share concentration alone does not demonstrate presence of or abuse of monopoly pow er. The economist William Baumol and his colleagues have developed the concept of contestability, w hich argues that even in the presence of monopoly concentration, the concentration can sometimes be explained by the lack of profitability, due perhaps to the lack of barriers to entry, to the presence of effective substitutes, or to other factors [11] , [12] , [13] . M any A merican cities are currently reduced to only a single new spaper, and w hile this is a source of considerable concern, no one is arguing that new spapers are earning monopoly profits (see, e.g., [61] , [91] ). Baumol's test for the presence or absence of contestability is the firm's ability to earn enough in one market to subsidize others. This demonstrates the presence of market pow er by demonstrating the presence of monopoly prices, evidenced by the ability to generate subsidies, and demonstrates anticompetitive behavior by demonstrating the use of these subsidies to deter entry by competitors.
v It might be argued that since electronic businesses have no barriers to entry, contestability cannot be applicable. We prefer to use contestability as Baumol proposed; w e look at Google, w e see extraordinary margins sufficient to provide massive subsidies in unrelated lines of business, and w e seek an explanation for the absence of contestability these subsidies imply. Despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars on development, and an additional $100 million on advertising, M icrosoft has not yet been able to provide search that is fully comparable to Google's. M icrosoft readily admits that Bing is not yet fully able to match Google w ith respect to certain categories of search [34] . In a recent blog post by Dave H einer, M icrosoft admitted that it is having difficulty catching up to Google because of Google's superior "long tail" search, coupled w ith other netw ork effects.
A dditionally, w e learned in the M icrosoft trial that absence of contestability may lead to consumer harm. If a company is earning so much in operating systems that it can afford to subsidize w eb brow sers, then the company is both enjoying monopoly pow er in operating systems and overcharging for them, and it is ultimately reducing consumer choice in other areas.
vi
While subsidized preemptive line extensions may increase consumer choice initially, they force other firms out of the market or deter entry, and ultimately reduce future consumer options.
We believe the same arguments w ill need to be established in any antitrust litigation involving Google, and there are several areas that w ill need to be explored, both in understanding Google's actions and indeed in assessing the actions of any company w ith a similar digital business strategy:
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural • Is Google over-charging consumers or harming consumers in other w ays?
• A re corporations harmed by the market pow er provided by a third party payer system, w hich frees Google from many marketplace restraints and does, as w e have seen, allow Google considerable latitude in setting keyw ord auction prices?
• Is Google earning enough from sponsored search to subsidize almost all of other businesses, including gM ail, Google Office, Latitude, gDrive, and others? If so, by Baumol's contestability argument, it can therefore be presumed to enjoy monopoly pricing pow er in its core search business. But is Google indeed intentionally subsidizing these other businesses, deterring entry and, ultimately, allow ing them to charge monopoly prices later, either for these offerings or for search going forw ard? Is the competitive process likely to be harmed?
Consumer Confusion and the Purchase of I nferior Products and Services
Confusion matters. Consumers may be purchasing inferior goods from an inferior supplier because the preferred or legitimate supplier w as not capable of matching fraudulent bids. Simple comparison of costs w ill suffice to show that an illegitimate attacker w ill often outbid the legitimate ow ner of a trademark. This is not solely a hypothetical argument defended w ith simple computational models, but is also defensible on theoretical terms. M odeling show s, not surprisingly, that " the intermediary's profit-maximizing design choice, by attributing a positive w eight to the firms' bids, tends to obfuscate search results and reduce overall consumer surplus compared to the socially optimal design of fully transparent results ranked purely on product performance." In other w ords, the use of paid search reduces consumer w elfare [90] .
A nd yet it is obvious from inspection that the firm in the top paid search location is not alw ays inferior. A gain, by charging the trademark ow ner just enough and granting the trademark ow ner top the spot in sponsored search, Google maximizes its ow n revenue [39] .
In its complaint against Google, A merican airlines argued both that Google w as creating confusion and that this confusion allow ed Google to force A merican to bid, supporting both the argument of confusion and the argument of channel pow er from our discussion of essential facilities and distribution above [35] .
" In fact, because of the dominant role of Google' s search engine in consumers' Internet usage and habits, Google effectively forces American Airlines to purchase the ' rights' to have the official American Airlines advertisements appear when Internet users search the web for the American Airlines M arks. In other words, Google has set up a system wherein American Airlines and others, are, de facto, forced to pay Google to reduce the likelihood that consumers will be confused by Google' s own practices."
Consumer confusion w ill continue to be central to litigation against Google. Consumer confusion w as the basis of A merican A irlines complaint against Google, w hich Google settled [35] . Likew ise, the concept of consumer confusion and the prospect of consumer In the past consumers appeared to have been more confused about the nature of sponsored search than they are at present: Some consumers do not appear to notice that the top lines are labeled " sponsored links" , and some did not appear to understand that these are different from organic search results. We conducted a small real-time polling of 150 students at the first session of their undergraduate Wharton courses, assessing their beliefs about sponsored search. We found a much higher degree of understanding than w e saw in previous years. For example, less than 5% believed that the top line w as selected to be the best, w hile the others w ere roughly split betw een believing it w as usually sponsored or usually most popular. We are not yet sure w hat the implications of this change in aw areness might be or to w hat extent it is shared by the general population outside the ranks of students in highly technical business school courses.
Consumer Confusion and Purchase through H igher Cost Channels
Consumers may be misdirected to inappropriate or higher cost channels for the goods and services that they seek to buy. Consider the follow ing small hypothetical exercise, assuming the follow ing hypothetical market conditions. A ssume that users search for " M arriott Hotels A rlington" , and that Google misdirects 1/ 3 of its searchers to an aggregator w ebsite such as A rlingtonhotels.com. The aggregator then charges a 15% premium on bookings of M arriot rooms. That is, 15% of the room rate goes not to the individual M arriott hotel but to the aggregator as a fee for directing traffic to the hotel; this is true even though the traffic actually began by searching for this specific M arriott hotel. Because Google has 60% market share of the Internet search market, w e w ould calculate that 60%*1/ 3 = 20% of all searches are being misdirected to the aggregator rather than directly to M arriott. Furthermore, since 20% of consumers pay 15% less to M arriott than they otherw ise w ould, M arriott's losses due to Google are = 20% * 15%, or 3% of room revenues. A n expense like this, like a tax or other cost of doing business, is passed on to consumers, so that, on average, consumer prices for hotel rooms are 3% higher solely due to Google's allow ing a third party to pay for affiliation w ith " M arriott" searches and allow ing the third party to show up in sponsored searches for " M arriott" .
The conditions of this hypothetical appear to be very sensitive to the time at w hich the queries are generated. For w hatever reason, abusive search results that w e described in M arch of 2009 had vanished by M ay of 2009, making estimates of consumer harm a moving target and difficult to compute. But the w ebsite used in this example is not hypothetical. A rlingtonhotels.com actually does exist, and is one of over 50 aggregator w ebsites in the family otels.com.
Collectively, the tw o sections above suggest the possibility of harm due to abuse of trademarks and the misdirection of consumers more generally. A lthough this is a possibility, w e have not yet been able to measure it, provide a metric for it, or prove significant harm.
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural The lack of contestability and the presence of prices high enough to sustain cross subsidies satisfies Baumol's conditions for establishing that Google has been charging monopoly prices. A re these higher prices alw ays passed through to consumers, and if not, should w e care about Google's charges? That is, are higher prices to corporations grounds for antitrust actions? It's clear that consumers do not buy steel or aluminum in bulk commodity form, and yet antitrust litigation has been used to protect competition (see e.g., [78] ). A s noted previously, Google's third party payer business model allow s it enormous freedom in the pricing of keyw ords, and the issue of indirect consumer harm due to excessive corporate costs w ill be an increasingly important consideration in the regulation of digital businesses. Fortunately for the short term prospects of regulation of digital businesses, antitrust litigation does not require the demonstration that corporate competitors or corporate customers have already been harmed, that consumers have already been harmed, or indeed that any current harm has occurred, if the prospects for future harm appear sufficiently dangerous. Of course, how ever, the type of harm that is required for antitrust prosecution is dependent on multiple factors, including (i) the plaintiff, (ii) the legal theory for prosecution and (iii) the relief sought.
vii Injuries in antitrust litigation do not require demonstrating that competitors have been harmed; it is sufficient to demonstrate that competition has been harmed.
viii M oreover, in Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court stated, " A n act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman A ct only w hen it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality" ( [62] at 1434). Thus, if firms are spending more on defending their key w ords than w ould be optimal and the quality of search is inferior or more expensive than it otherw ise w ould be, it should be possible to demonstrate a violation of the Sherman A ct.
Corporate H arm, Present and Future: Cross-Subsidies and D enial of Future Entry
Bundling and tying are the most obvious w ays of exploiting cross subsidies. Bundling occurs w hen a monopoly seller either provides a second product w ith the purchase of the first monopoly offering " w ithout charge to consumers" w ithout charge; this is considered dangerous because ultimately, having driven out competitors to the second offering the monopolist can now charge monopoly prices for the second product as w ell. Tying occurs w hen the monopolist producer of a product sells it w hile requiring that the purchaser also pay for a second product, for w hich the monopolist can now charge w hatever it w ants. The applicability of bundling and tying w ould be much more clear and much more obvious if Google actually bundled YouTube or Google Office w ith search and w ith GPS services; this w ould allow the same logic used to attack M icrosoft's bundling of Internet Explorer. There may already be some form of bundling in the interaction among Google mail, search, and advertising. The applicability of bundling and tying may indeed be more clear after examination of the In A merican antitrust jurisprudence, the courts have found cross subsidies in certain cases to be an antitrust violation. The most extreme form of this is tying, w here the purchase of one product is made contingent upon the purchase of a second product. H ow ever, these need not actually represent separate purchases, merely represent transfer of earnings from one market to establish dominance in another. The courts may see Google's subsidies for services like YouTube and text-based voice mail or their most recent innovation of super-high speed ISP access as damaging to other firms that compete in these markets, using subsidized preemptive line extensions to deter market entry by other firms [44] , [48] . The courts generally view deterring entry as ultimately reducing consumer choice, and harming competition. A lthough readers w ho are not familiar w ith legal argument may see this as the interjection of personal bias from the authors, it is in fact a serious concern of the Department of Justice. One of the problems w ith cross subsidies as that w hile they may increase consumer choice initially, they tend to reduce consumer choice over the longer term by driving some innovators out of the market. M icrosoft may have increased consumer choice w ith Word, Excel, and IE, but w here are WordPerfect, 1-2-3, or N etscape today? The antitrust concerns w ith cross subsidies are based on the belief that subsidies (1) reflect monopoly pow er in the market that generates them and (2) generally reduce consumer choice in the market that receives them.
In fact, a cursory review of Google's products and services reveals over thirty products that are provided free to consumers, and analysts see this as contributing to Google's popularity and profitability [18] . These innovations may be provided as gifts to consumers and thus part of Google's philosophy of " don't be evil" , or they may represent subsidized preemptive line extensions, ensuring additional monopoly markets later. These are not strictly tied purchases, but cross subsidies and the possibility of reduced competition and future monopoly pricing w ill probably be investigated. The claim that Google is a monopoly, if some claim is made, w ill be based on some combination of the follow ing assertions:
1. Google is not principally an advertising company, but principally is a distribution company, w hich has chosen to represent itself as an advertising company.
2. In electronic distribution, it is not necessary to be a monopoly to have monopoly pow er.
3. Google's pricing of electronic distribution, an essential facility, is anticompetitive.
4. Google's actions, especially tying and bundling, demonstrate monopoly pricing pow er.
What is a M onopoly?
Under section 2 of the Sherman A ct, the inquiry of w hether a defendant can be charged w ith monopolization begins w ith the threshold question of the relevant market. A fter the relevant market has been identified, it is necessary to assess w hether the defendant N ote that nothing in the definition of monopoly or of monopoly pow er requires that the defendant be the only competitor in its industry, that it charge the highest possible prices, or that it charges its ow n profit maximizing price. Indeed, monopoly pow er is different from the offense of price fixing, and nothing in the definition of monopoly pow er even requires that the firm w ith monopoly pow er explicitly set prices itself.
I s Action N ecessary or Justified?
H ow ever, the mere possession of monopoly pow er in a relevant market is not a violation of Sherman A ct §2. " The mere possession of monopoly pow er, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlaw ful; it is an important element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is w hat attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic grow th. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power w ill not be found unlaw ful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct" ([89] at 407). A dditionally, recent Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest a narrow construction of violations under section 2 of the Sherman A ct, noting " as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal w ith its rivals at w holesale" ([60] at 1119).
The crux of any claim of monopolization (after defining the relevant market) w ill focus on w hether a firm truly engaged in anticompetitive behavior. Thus, in short, a monopolist w ill be found to violate §2 of the Sherman A ct if it engages in exclusionary or predatory conduct w ithout a valid business justification ( [55] at 157). In more complex cases in w hich the allegedly monopolizing acts are not independently illegal, the courts have engaged in a more thorough review of w hether the defendant has acquired or enhanced its monopoly pow er through means that are competitively unreasonable. The regulatory regime of the Sherman A ct w as soon extended w ith concepts of a natural monopoly and of a regulated natural monopoly, as embodied in the Kingsbury Commitment. These w ere needed in order to deal w ith the market pow er of A T& T, due to the combination of (1) the clear benefits of interconnectivity, leading to massive positive netw ork participation externalities, (2) the technical difficulties of interconnectivity of separate competing netw orks w ith existing hardw are available at the time, and (3) the enormous costs associated w ith the construction of redundant netw orks. Consumer w elfare and technology interacted in a w ay that demanded that A T& T be a monopoly, and that likew ise demanded regulation of that monopoly.
Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural It may be necessary once again to extend the regulatory regime of antitrust in order to deal w ith the market pow er obtained by Google, if it is felt that Google's pow er poses a sufficient threat and that both competition and w elfare demand regulation. If Google does have pow er, this pow er does not arise, as some have said, because search is a natural monopoly [53] , but rather because (1) search is an essential facility, needed both by consumers and by firms that offer goods and services to them, and (2) search engine companies' third party payer model effectively decouples the pricing of key w ords and of participation as the object of search from the regulation of the market, giving giant search companies such as Google effective monopoly pow er even in the absence of a formal monopoly, and (3) Google is demonstrably charging monopoly prices for keyw ords, as evidenced inter alia by cross subsidies and the contestability test of Baumol, and (4) as discussed above Google's use of these cross subsidies may be seen as subsidized preemptive line extensions, and they may at present or in the future harm competition.
Conclusions and D irections for Further Work Conclusions Regarding Five I ssues Studied
The first area w e addressed w as determining w hen you have a monopoly. The study of Google, like the prior antitrust case against M icrosoft, underscores the importance of defining the relevant market before assessing market share. A ny antitrust case against Google w ill begin by addressing w hether paid search is a form of advertising or a form of distribution. While w e believe that search is different from advertising, this w ill be hotly contested in any antitrust litigation concerning Google, and is likely to be hotly contested in future litigation, until case law effectively establishes w hen a new digital business model represents a new product or service.
The second area w as determining w hen a firm has monopoly pow er and monopoly ability to set prices. We believe w e have established that search is a form of distribution and that distribution is an essential facility w ith enormous pow er, and that this pow er comes even w ithout monopoly share as traditionally defined. Likew ise, w e believe that w e have established that monopoly pricing pow er is distinct from actually setting prices; that said, this may be seen as contingent on relevant market, and thus remains subject to interpretation by the courts. Contestability theory and the ability to price in one market at levels high enough to subsidize numerous unrelated markets has been seen in other instances as evidence of monopoly pricing pow er, and supports our conclusions.
The third area w as how to determine w hether consumers, corporations, and the competitive process has been harmed, focusing on Google. We have not established either measures for this or the presence of harm, and it remains a direction for future research, by academics, by companies that feel harmed, and by the courts.
We ask if monopoly abuses by digital businesses can be addressed by current regulatory practices, and conclude that this may be quite difficult. For example, w e cannot determine if Google obtained its pow er legally or not, and under current legal doctrine intent to monopolize and monopoly pow er obtained illegally are essential for prosecution. If Google is found to have monopoly pow er, and found to have caused harm, and can be show n to have obtained pow er legally w ithout intent to monopolize, then w e may have an instance in w hich current legal remedies are clearly inadequate.
Finally, w e asked if additional regulation might be needed, if for example search w ere found to be an essential facility and if the essential facilities doctrine w ere found to hold only w hen the ow ner of the facility and the harmed party w ere direct competitors in the same industry. M ore generally, as explored next, third party payer business models combined w ith electronic distribution may create a need for new regulation.
I s Additional Regulation Actually N eeded?
If there is harm it w ould appear that some action w ill be required to stop it, for three reasons that w ere explored above:
1. Google's pricing is decoupled from market discipline because the user and the payer are not the same, and hence high prices charged do not alter user behavior Thus, third party payer monopolies may be stable. A gain, in the specific instance of Google, even if Google w ere found to be an expensive monopolist, no one is in a position to offer search that consumers believe is cheaper. This is because it search could not be cheaper for consumers: Consumers think it is already cheaper than free, since it costs them nothing, and they are provided w ith a w ide range free ancillary services.
2. A nd, if search is found to be an essential facility and if use of Google is the stable search engine decision of most consumers, then this is the search engine w here corporations have to appear. Bidders w ill continue to bid, and if there is harm, then harm w ill continue to occur.
3. M oreover, since keyword auctions and sponsored search provide Google w ith the revenue stream it currently enjoys, then the ability to misdirect consumers and the ability to stifle competition in a range of markets that Google subsidizes both w ill remain. party payer distribution system. A s explored above, it is not clear if or how litigation w ill proceed in the case of Google, w hether harm has occurred, or w hether additional legislative or regulatory guidance is required in this instance. M ore generally, w e do feel that third party payer distribution systems are a fundamental departure from the sorts of issues faced w hen the Sherman A ct w as drafted or litigated in the past, and indeed that new digital business models w ill require new regulatory regimes.
D irections for Future Research
If additional regulation of Google is required it is not clear that current antitrust jurisprudence is prepared to address the regulation of third party payer digital businesses, any more than the Sherman A ct w as able to address natural monopolies. This did not mean that the Sherman A ct needed to be scrapped, or even formally amended. Rather, w hen society w anted the benefits of inter-operability that a monopoly telecommunications provider offered in the early 1900s, and also w anted protection from the potential abuses of a monopoly, a solution outside the remedies of the Sherman A ct w as required. The result w as the Kingsbury Commitment, w hich led to the first sanctioned, state-regulated, corporate monopoly. Society may w ant both w inner take all businesses and the illusion of cost-free service that comes from third party payer business models; it may also need to be protected from the potential abuses of monopoly that this may create. There is a clear need for future research at the intersection of business strategy, regulatory economics, information economics, and the law .
We have addressed the possible need for regulation if harm has been demonstrated. But is there really consumer harm or harm to competition? This needs to be more carefully assessed. We believe that w e have show n the possibility of harm due to consumer confusion, the possibility of harm due to stifling of competition, and the possibility of abusive monopoly pricing of an essential facility. We have not yet established that such harm exists, let alone provided a metric for it or a measure of it. Future research is necessary to address both deficiencies in the current w ork.
